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INTRODUCTION 
 
At a first level, the notions of “institutions” and “globalization” could appear to exclude or 
oppose each other. The notion of institution suggests stability or at least an attempt at 
stabilization. An institutionalist perspective starts from the basic recognition that human 
activities, including activities of an economic nature, are embedded and framed within larger 
institutional schemes that are, on the whole, quite stable (Weber 1978; Polanyi 1944). A core 
dimension of the institutionalist project has been to understand how embeddedness matters, 
how institutions constrain and structure action, create regularities and stability, limiting at the 
same time the range of options and opportunities. In contrast, the process of globalization is 
often associated with the breakdown of traditional rules of the game and institutions, in 
particular through the weakening of national states and their order-creating capacities. The 
champions of that process welcome this evolution. They see globalization as a process where 
“markets” displace and replace “institutions” through time, bringing along wealth and 
development, economic, social, if not moral progress. The critics of globalization, on the 
other hand, equate this evolution with anomie, instability and disorder. The withering of 
traditional polities and institutions is often described, from such a critical stance, as one of the 
negative externalities of globalization. 
 
The objective of this chapter is to overcome the apparent opposition between the two notions 
of “institutions” and “globalization”. We suggest instead another perspective, where the two 
notions emerge as being tightly intertwined. Firstly, we want to argue that our reading of the 
phenomenon of globalization will be significantly enhanced if we bring to bear upon that 
phenomenon an institutionalist perspective. The globalization of our world is, we propose, 
deeply about institutions. It is about the rules of the game in which economic and social 
activity is embedded and about the profound transformation of those rules in a world where 
order-creating capacities are not coinciding anymore with nation-state power. We argue that 
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much of this institution building is of a transnational rather than a global nature; it unfolds 
across blurring boundaries between a variety of actors from different nation states without 
necessarily implying convergence and homogenization at the global level. Second, we also 
want to argue that institutions and processes of institutionalization cannot be understood today 
without taking transnationalization into account. Most spheres of economic and social life, in 
most corners of the world, are not only constrained and framed by local and national sets of 
institutions but they become enmeshed as well in transnational dynamics. 
 
We define institutions as those collective frames and systems that provide stability and 
meaning to social behaviour and social interaction and take on a rule-like status in social 
thought and action (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Douglas, 1986:46-48). Institutions stabilize and 
survive through self-activating social processes of reproduction (Jepperson 1991). At the 
same time, we see institutions not only as sets of constraints but also as tools and resources 
enabling action (Clemens and Cook 1999). In our view, institutions have both a structural 
dimension, including formal and informal rules and systems and an ideational dimension, 
including normative and cognitive schemes. The mix of those two dimensions can vary. The 
reach of institutions will also vary and it will be likely, in fact, to co-vary with the scope of 
social action and interaction. In other words, if action and interaction only play out at the level 
of a local tribe, locally defined and enforced sets of rules will be both necessary and 
sufficient. If action and interaction expand beyond the boundaries of the tribe, then there will 
probably be a need for translocal institutional frames that may displace, complement or 
transform local ones. While institutional resilience can be quite strong, institutions can change 
and what this chapter does is explore some of the dynamics of institutional change – those 
more particularly associated with the process of transnationalization.  
 
We use the term “transnationalization” to describe a world – our world – where economic and 
social organization and coordination increasingly reach across national borders. The label 
“globalization” is frequently used to refer to the rapid expansion of operations and 
interactions across and beyond national boundaries. However, we find it unsatisfactory; 
“globalization” has become such a catch-work that its meaning is highly blurred. 
Transnationalization, we propose, is a more suitable and focused concept to make sense of the 
world we live in. We agree with Hannerz (1996:6) that “the term ‘transnational’ offers a more 
adequate label for phenomena which can be of quite variable scale and distribution, even 
when they do share the characteristic of not being contained within the state”. The term 
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“transnational” suggests entanglement and blurred boundaries to a degree that the term 
“global” could not. In our contemporary world, it becomes increasingly difficult to separate 
what takes place within national boundaries and what takes place across and beyond nations. 
The neat opposition between “globalization” and “nations”, often just beneath the surface in a 
number of debates, does not really make sense whether empirically or analytically. 
Organizations, activities and individuals constantly span multiple levels, rendering obsolete 
older lines of demarcation (Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006). At the same time, the term 
transnational does not imply, as globalization often does, the disappearance of states. It 
suggests instead that states are now only one type of actor among others and that they have to 
profoundly evolve as a consequence (Katzenstein et al. 1998). 
 
The term transnationalization is also a term better adapted to our times than the term 
“internationalization”. Transnationalization suggests more than the mere projection of 
national states and national actors outside their borders. It implies that many connections go 
beyond state-to-state and firm-to-firm interactions. Transnationalization points to the 
progressive structuring of spheres of action and interaction with an emergent identity, where 
debates cannot be reduced to negotiations between national identities. Transnationalization 
means, in other words, that the world “in between” nation-states is not an anomic world with 
no order, power or institutions apart from those projected by strong states. In fact, the term 
suggests that there is a need to consider transnationalization from an institutional perspective 
– to focus on those processes of institutionalization and de-institutionalization associated with 
the transnationalization of economic and social activity. 
 
We explore, in this chapter, the interplay between institutions and transnationalization. We 
start with a review of the literature and get a sense of how different perspectives have handled 
those notions and sometimes their interaction. Then, building on recent developments within 
the broad family of institutionalism, we propose a reading of transnationalization through an 
institutional lens. In other words, we approach transnationalization as an institutionalization 
process. Finally, here again building on recent contributions, we bring the transnational 
dimension into the study of institutions. We do this in order to enhance our understanding of 
contemporary processes of institutionalization and de-institutionalization and hence to 
contribute to debates on institutional change. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
We take in turn four different theoretical repertoires and explore what they have to tell us, if 
anything, about the interplay between “institutions” and “transnationalization”. Three of those 
repertoires are inevitable when we talk about institutions and institutionalization – 
organizational institutionalism, societal institutionalism and World System institutionalism. 
We choose to bring in the fourth repertoire – the International Relations Literature – because 
it is important for a discussion of transnationalization even though it brings less to debates on 
institutionalization.  
 
Organizational Institutionalism and its Agnostic Stance on Transnationalization 
The field of ‘organizational institutionalism’ encompasses a wide range of conceptual and 
empirical studies demonstrating how organizations are shaped by, adapt to and interact with 
institutionally legitimized rules and templates in their environment. In the tradition of 
classical authors (Barnard 1938, Blau 1955, Gouldner 1954, Parsons 1956, Selznick 1949, 
Weber 1978), organizations are conceived as adaptive social systems embedded in and 
responsive to wider societal and institutional influences rather than just as mere production 
systems geared towards efficiency. In pursuit of the neo-institutionalist turn introduced by 
Meyer and Rowan (1977), DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and Zucker (1977) recent work gives 
priority to cognitive and cultural over regulative mechanisms of institutionalization. The 
comprehensive concept of institutions used in these analyses encompasses any kind of 
sustained, reproduced social practice that may be relevant to organizations, including taken-
for-granted practices, norms and values. 
 
Organizational institutionalism has mainly focused on the study of institutionalization 
processes in organizations or organizational fields and has highlighted isomorphic pressures 
leading to homogenization of organizational practices and forms. On the whole, 
organizational institutionalism has taken a rather agnostic stance on transnationalization. 
Studies of organizational fields are often limited to the local or industry level; they rarely 
encompass a national or even transnational dimension. Institutional processes that extend 
beyond the boundaries of organizational or sectoral fields or run through vertically layered 
institutional orders have been largely neglected. This agnostic stance of organizational 
institutionalism on transnationalization becomes increasingly problematic as the horizons of 
action and meaning of the actors become transnational and global interdependencies increase. 
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This also applies to the recent revival of interest in institutional entrepreneurship and 
institutional change. Building on DiMaggio’s (1988) seminal article, various authors have 
investigated how institutionally embedded actors engage in shaping and changing their 
institutional frameworks. Oliver (1991) identified various strategies ranging from passive 
conformity to proactive manipulation by which organizations act in a given institutional 
environment. Greenwood et al. (2002) investigated the role of professional associations in the 
transformation of institutional fields. The large majority of these studies, though, focus once 
more at institutional change at the local and industry level (see e.g. Dorado 2005, Fligstein 
2001, Greenwood and Suddaby 2006, Maguire et al. 2004). Very few studies have analyzed 
institution building at the global level (Maguire and Hardy 2006). 
 
Organizational institutionalism, though, is of relevance to the theme of this chapter because it 
provides key concepts that, when further elaborated, can be fruitfully applied to the study of 
institutionalization in the transnational sphere. We suggest that this applies particularly to 
process theories of institutionalization and deinstitutionalization, concepts of diffusion, 
translation and editing, and organizational field analysis. 
 
Organizational institutionalism offers a micro approach to institutional change that can be 
extended to macro levels of analysis. Building on Berger and Luckmann (1967), 
institutionalization has been defined by Tolbert and Zucker (1996) as a three phase process. 
The first phase, called habitualization, comprises the development of patterned behaviors 
through recurrent and regular interactions to which shared meanings and understandings 
become attached. The second phase, called objectification, is the subsequent process of 
generalization of these particular meanings and understandings beyond the specific context in 
which they crystallized. This occurs together with the stabilization of a consensus on the value 
of the behavioral patterns and of their associated meanings and understandings among social 
actors. This consensus can translate into fragile preliminary structures and rules that can still 
be revised or challenged at this semi-institutionalized stage. The third and last stage of 
institutionalization is one of ‘sedimentation’. It is characterized by a wider spread of patterned 
behaviors and meanings and by the solidification and perpetuation of structures. During this 
last stage, institutions can acquire the quality of 'exteriority’, i.e., they can become taken for 
granted and develop a reality of their own.  
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From a process perspective, de-institutionalization is another important element of any 
institutional change. Institution building in the transnational sphere may equally require a fair 
degree of de-institutionalization of rules at local or national levels. Following Oliver (1991, 
1992), political, functional and social pressures can lead to de-institutionalization. Political 
pressures arise from intentional interest-guided actions of individuals who question the 
legitimacy of existing institutions. Functional pressures may lead to de-institutionalization 
when stakeholders challenge the legitimacy of an institution because of its growing 
incompatibility with technical and economic requirements. Social pressure can lead to de-
institutionalization when differentiation and fragmentation of an organization's members and 
environment lead to an erosion of institutionalized rules through a declining normative 
consensus and cognitively shared systems of meaning. Faced with such pressures for 
institutional erosion, actors may engage in various maintenance and repair activities to 
stabilize institutions (Suchman 1995a; Lawrence and Suddaby, in this handbook).  
 
In combination, institutionalization and de-institutionalization provide powerful concepts for 
the analysis of institutional dynamics. These concepts have been revised and refined by 
various authors (Barley and Tolbert 1997, Seo and Creed 2002; Greenwood and Hinings 
1996; Greenwood et al. 2002; Greenwood and Suddaby 2006; Suchman 1995b). They are 
now able to encompass pragmatic legitimacy based on self-interest, moral legitimacy based 
on normative approval as well as cognitive legitimacy based on comprehensibility and taken-
for-grantedness (Suchman 1995a). Lawrence et al. (2001) include power, discipline and 
dominance as other sources of institutionalization that may lead to a variety of dynamics. The 
role of social movements in de-stabilizing institutional fields and transforming extant socio-
economic practices has also been identified as important. It has been, for example, at the 
center of the study by Lounsbury et al. (2003) on the rise of a for-profit recycling industry in 
the United States. Social movements also played a key role in the emergence of international 
standards like ISO (Walgenbach 2000).  
 
The common point of these process approaches is that they allow for contestation between 
various interested actors in the first two phases of the process and acknowledge the co-
existence of different degrees of institutionalization (Jepperson 1991, Dorado 2005). This 
makes them attractive concepts for the analysis of institutional phenomena in the transnational 
sphere where struggles between different parties and a fair degree of institutions in the 
making are to be expected. So far, however, these processes have been rarely studied in 
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multinational organizations or in multi-jurisdictional and multi-layered institutional settings 
(see Suchman 1995b for an exception) which are likely to be characterized by parallel 
bottom-up and top-down processes of institutionalization and de-institutionalization.  
 
 Another contribution of organizational institutionalism is that if offers the tools to study 
cross-border diffusion of practices, templates and rules as sources of institutionalization and 
de-institutionalization. Diffusion can be based on structural relationships or on cultural media 
and artifacts. While one stream of organizational institutionalism has emphasized 
isomorphism, this does not mean that diffusion always leads to increasing similarity. The 
results of diffusion processes are indeed quite variable. Various reasons for this variability 
and divergence have been proposed, e.g., transmission mistakes (Zucker 1977) and socio-
cultural differences. Westney (1987) showed that imitation always involves an element of 
innovation. Czarniawska and Sevón (1996), Sahlin-Andersson (1996) and Sahlin-Andersson 
and Engwall (2002) analyze the way in which transfers of management practices between 
different local contexts consist of translation and editing activities between different cultural 
and social contexts, and show that these translations may lead to rather divergent outcomes. In 
her analysis of the transfer of the US model of economic organization to Europe, Djelic 
(1998) highlights how geopolitical dependencies, transnational elite networks and the strength 
and type of resistance groups have led to different adaptations of the model in Germany, 
France and Italy. The extension and refinement of diffusion and transfer studies along these 
lines promises substantial contributions to questions about the degree to which increasing 
cross-border and global exchanges will give rise to homogenization, hybridization or 
continued variety of transnational institutional rules. 
 
Finally, the concept of organizational field can be elaborated in ways that allow the 
integration of a transnational dimension into institutional analysis. In the original definition, 
organizational field refers to “organizations that in the aggregate constitute a recognized area 
of institutional life (DiMaggio and Powell 1991: 64f). While this concept usually applied to 
the isomorphic diffusion of organizational forms at a local or industry level, more recently it 
has been used to depict institutionalization processes that unfold around regulatory “issues” 
(Hoffman 1999) and “transnational governance” (Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006). Several 
authors have called to give more attention to the relative openness of fields (Greenwood and 
Hinings 1996), their nestedness into wider institutional arrangements (Scott 2001) and the 
unfolding of contradictory logics within such fields (Seo and Creed 2002). Studies on the 
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emergence of new fields point to the importance of social movements (Lounsbury et al. 2003, 
Walgenbach 2000). Building on these treatments, Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson (2006: 18f) 
suggest that “transnational governance fields” are a pertinent unit of analysis to study multi-
level institutional dynamics that unfold through various overlapping network relations across 
blurring territorial and jurisdictional boundaries and are driven by institutional forces that 
constitute a transnational meaning system. 
 
Societal Institutionalism and the Challenge of Opening National Systems  
The label ‘societal institutionalism’ refers to what is now a dense set of conceptual and 
empirical studies focusing on the historical emergence and contemporary structuring of 
national economies. Societal institutionalism has related the structures and strategies of firms, 
the relationships between different stakeholder groups, the roles of managers, the 
development and distribution of skills between various layers of employees to the distinct 
social and institutional settings in which firms operate. The institutions receiving most 
attention in societal institutionalism are the state, the financial, educational and training 
systems, the labour market regime and norms and values governing trust and authority 
relationships (Hall and Soskice 2001, Whitley 1999). 
 
The main focus of societal institutionalism has been the systemic nature of national 
configurations of institutions. And a key preoccupation of that literature has been to show 
how those stable systems in turn shape and define national economic organisations and their 
self-reproduction. The picture has generally been one of multiple closed systems, where each 
national ensemble – institutions and organisations – functions in relative isolation from the 
others. Such a description of social and economic reality may hold as a kind of ideal type for 
the past – and even there with a varying degree of applicability in different historical periods. 
Quack (2006a), for example, argues that transnational influences significantly shaped German 
capitalism during its formative period. In the contemporary period, the notion of relatively 
closed business systems become even more obsolete because of the growing transnational 
interconnectedness of economic actors across the world and the emergence and strengthening 
of various forms of institutionalised rule systems at the transnational level (Brunsson and 
Jacobsson 2000, Djelic and Quack 2003, Drori et al. 2006, Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 
2006).  
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There have been a number of attempts to date to adapt the analytical framework of societal 
institutionalism in a way that can help meet the theoretical challenges raised by economic 
internationalization and transnationalization (for an overview, see Deeg and Jackson 2007). 
These attempts reflect essentially three main strategies. One path has been to call into 
question the conception of institutions as fully determining economic organisation and action. 
The idea, instead, is to highlight and look for the degrees of freedom that economic actors can 
enjoy within a given institutional framework. The focus, here, is on the existing and potential 
variety of strategies and behavioural patterns within a given society (Sorge 2000), on the 
multiplicity of institutional repertoires that co-exist and linger on in the background of any 
apparently dominant institutional frame (Crouch 2005, Morgan and Quack 2005, Schneiberg 
2007) as well as on the tensions that can arise from the conflicting interests of different 
societal groups leading to contradictions within a particular societal system and potentially to 
institutional change (Almond and Rubery 2000; Quack et al. 2000). In his studies of the 
German biotech sector, Casper has made explicit this critique of societal institutionalism, 
suggesting that  
 “static descriptions of existing institutional environments must be combined with micro-
level accounts, tracing how firms, governments, and other actors within the economy 
experiment with, and at times re-configure, the institutional tool-kits at their disposal” 
(Casper 2000). 
Such micro-level accounts can build upon various theoretical approaches. Where Casper 
(2000) turns to micro-economic theories to bridge the gap between dynamic interactions at the 
level of firms, regulators or policy makers and pre-existing institutional frames, we suggest 
that sociological approaches that highlight the creative dimension of social behaviour building 
on interactionism or ethno-methodology are other possibilities (Douglas 1986, Emirbayer and 
Mische 1998, Joas 1992). 
 
A second route for adapting societal institutionalism has been to explore what happens when 
actors or organizations become involved in multiple institutional environments with different 
and sometimes conflicting rule systems. A particularly interesting laboratory here appears to 
be the multinational company and in recent years studies on its nature and development have 
flourished (Harzing and Sorge 2005, Lane 2000, Morgan et al. 2001, Morgan et al. 2005). The 
internationalisation of companies creates a ‘battle-field’ where different constituencies enter 
in conflict and negotiate (Kristensen and Zeitlin 2001, Sharpe 2001). Transnational transfers 
of business practices generally lead to hybridization of practices at the organisational level but 
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also of managerial ‘mental maps’ (Smith and Elger 2000, Lane 2000). In time, as Christel 
Lane (2001) argues in the case of German pharmaceutical companies, this can trigger a 
transformation of domestic institutions (see also Lane 2003, Vitols 2005a, b). Another 
important arena for contestion between competing institutional influences are global 
production networks (Lane and Probert 2006). When change in leading transnational 
companies reaches a critical mass, managers are encouraged or even required to press for 
institutional reforms at the national level. The adaptation of the theory here leads us well 
beyond the notion of isolated and self-contained national business system. We need to 
reconcile the idea of different systems with the reality of homogenizing pressures – the 
outcome being in general one form or another of hybridization or creolization. 
 
A third path, still barely explored, would be to look at the transnational arena as an 
institutionalised or institutionalising space. Hollingsworth and Boyer (1997), for example, 
argue that social systems of production need increasingly to be seen as nested within a 
complex system of regional, national but also international arrangements. Whitley (2003) 
argues that since 1945 the international business environment has undergone a transformation 
from a particularistic logic to an increasing formalisation and standardisation of the rules of 
the economic game. So far, however, societal institutionalism has contributed little to our 
understanding of the processes leading to the emergence of new institutional arrangements in 
the transnational sphere. The few budding attempts, recently, at exploring this frontier have 
built in part upon different theoretical repertoires. Authors like Brunsson and Jacobsson 
(2000), Morgan (2001), Djelic and Bensedrine (2001) or Plehwe (2003) look at the actors, 
preconditions and mechanisms involved in the emergence and transformation of institutions 
in the ‘transnational social space’ (Morgan 2001). Djelic and Quack (2007) argue that the 
concept of path-dependency needs to be reconsidered in the context of open systems. Their 
analysis points to increasing co-evolutionary interaction between national path transformation 
and transnational path creation.  
 
World system Institutionalism, Globalization – and their Limits 
The label ‘world-system institutionalism’ refers to a now well-established tradition of cultural 
institutionalism. In that tradition, institutions are ‘wider cultural and symbolic patterns’, 
increasingly with a ‘global’ or transnational scope, that shape and to a large extent determine 
organizations, structures or actors and script behaviors and interactions (Meyer and Rowan 
1977, Scott et al. 1994, Jepperson 2000a, b). Cultural processes with a transnational scope 
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explain to a significant extent changes in states, organizations or individual behaviors (Meyer 
et al. 1997).  
 
World society is not only a society of empowered actors; it is a society permeated by and 
permeating actors with powerful cultural values or institutional frames (Meyer et al. 1997). 
These frames are shaped and diffused as global models and blueprints along which states (and 
other actors) are benchmarked and possibly transformed (Finnemore 1993). There is no global 
state but the alternative to state power is not anarchy and chaos. Meyer et al. (1997) 
convincingly argue that the cultural and institutional web characteristic of world society can 
be, at least in part, a functional equivalent to a centralized, state-like global power. The 
stateless but rational, organized and universalist character of world society may in fact add to 
rather than detract from the speed of diffusion and the global pervasiveness of standardized 
models and blueprints (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). 
 
This line of research and its elaborate theory of world society are enlightening. They bring 
cultural perspectives and explanations into the analysis of states, organizations and their 
transformation and provide evidence that actorhood is of the ‘soft’ kind – that is always itself 
embedded in cultural frames – and in fact empowered by those cultural frames. This line of 
research shows that the real sources of power and authority in our societies are cultural and 
diffuse rather than structural and centralized. Studies within this tradition show that states 
remain important regulators but that they are themselves embedded in, shaped and fashioned 
by a powerful world society and its associated institutional and cultural templates (Meyer et al 
1997; Jacobsson 2006). This research has also contributed to our knowledge about key 
carriers of global models and blueprints (Boli and Thomas 1999, Finnemore 1996).  
 
These studies, however, focus mostly on how global cultural models and institutional 
blueprints are diffused, potentially shaping localized discourse and/or structures and activities. 
We learn less on the construction, and negotiation of global cultural models or institutions. 
We also lack an understanding of actual processes and mechanisms of diffusion and local 
reception – where transnational institutional blueprints meet with local institutional traditions. 
Finally, there is room for more work – both empirically and conceptually – on carriers. There 
is an extremely rich and diverse pool of carriers out there that has only recently started to be 
studied in and for itself (Boli and Thomas 1999; Greenwood et al. 2002; Sahlin-Andersson 
and Engwall 2002; Djelic and Quack 2003; Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006). Carriers are 
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often located at the interface of multiple sources of embeddedness. In particular, they often 
cross and overcome the national/transnational border and contribute to back and forth 
translation and negotiation (Campbell 2004). Studies combining an analysis of the activities 
and interests of carriers with an account of their institutional embeddedness (with sometimes 
multiple and conflicting sources of embeddedness) should help us capture power interplays 
and processes of interest formation in highly institutionalized settings with a transnational 
scope. They will also allow us to understand how transnational cultural models or institutions 
are negotiated, constructed, diffused and adapted through time – leading us well beyond the 
notion of institutional convergence. 
 
Learning about Transnationalization from the International Relations Literature 
The International Relations literature is an interesting tradition to explore when we think 
about transnationalization and its mechanisms. Traditionally, the perspective in political 
science and in the International Relations literature has been of a highly state-centered 
internationalization process (Martin 2005). If anything, the structure of the international 
sphere is given by and through negotiations between states and essentially reflects, at any 
given point in time, a particular balance of power. For some time now, though, a number of 
scholars within the International Relations community have contributed to an evolution of 
those state-centered perspectives in interesting directions.  
 
A first line of reaction has been to point to the progressive ‘retreat of the state’ in a 
globalizing world (Strange 1996). Many contemporary regulatory reforms have been 
associated with privatization and the partial dismantling of public services and welfare states 
(e.g. Vogel 1996; Djelic 2006). In the process, states have in fact not withered away. Granted 
they may be changing, potentially quite significantly. As used by Majone (1996) and others, 
the concept of “regulatory states” points to a significant evolution of states and the way they 
control and influence activities and actors. Regulatory states are not less influential or 
powerful than more interventionist states but they are increasingly embedded in complex 
constellations of actors and structures (e.g. Higgott et al. 2000; O’Brien et al. 2000). As such, 
their input and identity is difficult to disentangle and separate from the inputs and identities of 
other actors involved.  
 
Furthermore, it becomes less and less acceptable to treat states as monoliths. State institutions 
are complex patchworks and this complexity becomes all the more striking that the porosity 
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of state institutions has increased significantly albeit differentially. In fact, boundaries may 
now be tighter and more rigid between sectors of state administration than between particular 
state agencies and other actors in the same sector or field.  
 
Along with the idea of a retreat and transformation of states, there has been a focus on the 
widespread expansion of various forms of private authority (Cutler et al. 1999; Hall and 
Biersteker 2002). There is an interesting parallel with pre-modern (i.e. pre-nation-states) times 
when private authority spanning local communities was widespread; the lex mercatoria (or 
merchant law) being a striking example (Berman and Kaufman 1978; Lehmkuhl 2003). The 
modern concept of private authority is wide and encompassing, referring to a multiplicity of 
rule-making and institution-building activities that emerge and are structured outside states.  
 
Some contributions within the International Relations literature pointed already in the 1980s 
to the importance here of transnational social networks. Using the concept of “social 
networks” in its descriptive and first level sense, Kees van der Pijl and the Amsterdam school 
explored the sociology and political economy of transnational class formation (Van der Pijl 
1984, 1998). They unearthed in the process important mechanisms of transnational 
governance that reproduced the class power of particular groups and associated structures of 
dominance – both reaching progressively a transnational scale and scope.  
 
Haas (1989, 1992) also pointed to the importance of social networks as key mechanisms of 
governance crossing over state boundaries. Haas’ concept of ‘epistemic communities’ makes 
reference to communities of expertise and practice that are increasingly transnational while 
individuals in those communities retain some form of local or national influence and authority 
(Haas 1992). This mix can allow those groups to be powerful mechanisms at the interface 
between transnational and national institutional spheres. The understanding of ‘social 
networks’ here is a sophisticated one. Epistemic communities are ‘faceless’ and members 
generally have direct interactions only with small subsets of the community. Those 
communities are nevertheless powerfully connected. More than through direct and regular 
contacts, the ‘glue’ is generated by common cognitive and value schemes, often associated 
with complex socialization processes and generally translated into ‘expertise’, shared interests 
and projects. It is interesting, here, to draw a parallel between this concept and the idea of 
‘carriers’ as emerging in ‘world-system institutionalism’. 
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More recent contributions talk about regulatory networks, underscoring the wide variety of 
public and private actors involved in rule-making, institution-building and monitoring. As 
Schmidt puts it, ‘though the hangover of the traditional focus on the state’s legal commands 
has been felt in the study of regulation, both European and American scholars of policy 
networks have advanced perspectives on regulation rooted more firmly in institutional 
dynamics and political behaviour’ (Schmidt 2004: 276). The idea of regulatory networks 
points to complex interconnections between a multiplicity of individual and organizational 
actors – interconnections that can be direct or mediated. The idea also suggests organizational, 
cognitive and normative frames or arenas in which those interactions take place and are 
structured. Finally, with a focus on regulatory networks comes a question about their 
legitimacy and more generally about the legitimacy of private authority. With a broadening 
set of rule-makers and institution-builders, the way of authorizing rules and institutional 
frames is likely to broaden as well. Coercive rules that rest on the monopoly of states over 
legal authority and physical violence or on citizens’ habitual obedience come to represent 
only one among several forms of authorization.  
 
Building upon the richness of insights emerging from a confrontation of the different 
repertoires presented above, we sketch out below a theoretical frame that allows us to read the 
contemporary interaction between institutions and transnationalization. This frame has two 
main dimensions – firstly, we reinterpret transnationalization as institutional recombination 
and, secondly, we consider the impact of transnationalization on processes of 
institutionalization. 
 
TRANSNATIONALIZATION AS INSTITUTIONAL RECOMBINATION 
 
A core insight of institutional theory is that the patterning of social life is not produced solely 
by the aggregation of individual and organizational behaviours but also by institutions that 
structure and shape the interests, strategies and behaviours of social actors. Authors like Ann 
Swidler (1986) or Mary Douglas (1986), however, draw our attention to the fact that this 
institutional patterning is not fully deterministic. Institutions (or culture in the terminology of 
Swidler) provide ‘tool kits’ or repertoires from which actors can to some extent choose in 
order to construct their ‘strategies of action’. The resulting variety in social behaviours 
generates a pool of alternative mental maps and patterns of behaviour, which under specific 
conditions can come to interact with each other and challenge existing institutions. 
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Where do Transnational Institutions come from? 
In processes of institutional emergence, decline or change, new configurations are rarely 
created from scratch. Rather, the genesis of institutions in contemporary societies unfolds in 
general in a form that is closer to ‘bricolage’ than to ex-nihilo generation (Offe 1995, Hall and 
Taylor 1996, Campbell 1997, March and Olsen 1998). Actors build upon, work around, 
recombine, reinvent and reinterpret logics and institutional arrangements that function 
elsewhere and with which they are familiar. Within the context of nation states, the creation of 
new institutions is likely to be strongly influenced by the state, in the form of political actors 
or agencies (Clemens and Cook 1999). But even there, this should not blind us to the impact 
and significance of other actors.  
 
The relevance of the idea of ‘bricolage’ (Douglas 1986) becomes only more significant when 
we look at processes of institutional emergence and institution building at the transnational 
level. We suggest, in fact, that turning our attention to the transnational level should go hand 
in hand with a refocusing away from the idea of institutional configurations to that of 
dynamic institutional recombination. Moving from institutions to institutionalization and 
thinking about the latter as a set of sequential stages – habitualisation, objectification and 
sedimentation (Tolbert and Zucker 1996) – suggests that the level of embeddedness and 
robustness of institutional rules will vary. Thinking about institutionalization as a process also 
implies to think in parallel about processes of de-institutionalization (Oliver 1992). It opens 
the door, as well, to the possibility of social intervention and hence agency. Institutions are 
not only constraining; they are also enabling. Institutions are not static systems; they are 
malleable processes. 
 
Institution building in the transnational sphere involves multiple actors or groups of actors 
with mental and action maps originating from quite different institutional contexts. Very 
often, those originating contexts have a societal or national character (Morgan 2001, 2000b). 
Hence, the process of institution building at the transnational level cannot be conceived in 
total isolation and abstraction from national institutional contexts. Multiple national actors 
extend their national contextual rationalities into the international sphere where they interact, 
confront and negotiate with each other. Those participants may become involved in institution 
building in a newly emerging transnational sphere (McNichol and Bensedrine 2003, Engels 
2006). Or they may be playing a part in reforming, renegotiating and transforming existing 
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transnational institutional arrangements as motivations, power relations and conditions change 
over time (Lehmkuhl 2003, Botzem and Quack 2006). Through time, repeated interactions 
and the building up of a transnational frame, a number of actors may be emerging that have a 
transnational – in the sense of not purely national – identity or sense of self. 
 
Historical Scenarii – Transnational Organizations or Regional Federations 
Historically, a first and obvious scenario for institution building in the transnational arena has 
been the formal setting up of a transnational organization. This, naturally, is an old scenario 
and, with a little bit of a stretch, the Roman Catholic Church could be used as an illustration, 
and a successful one at that. Without going that far back into history, a number of other 
examples come to mind. The League of Nations was an important ancestor, although with 
little impact ultimately (Murray 1987, Knock 1995). In the years following 1945, the project 
of structuring the transnational space around transnational organizations regained strength 
after nearly two decades of strong nationalism and protectionism. The United Nations and its 
various divisions, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC later to 
become the OECD), the International Labour Office (ILO), the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) or the World Bank and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, later to 
become the World Trade Organization) all proceeded from the same logic.  
 
These organizations all had a centralized core, in charge of setting the rules and building 
institutions at the transnational level. And this centralized core directly reflected the interests 
of national member states – as conveyed by public or semi-public types of actors such as 
representatives of particular national governments and polities. In that context, such 
transnational organizations were in fact little more than the tools of particular nation-states 
and governments, mirroring at any point in time the existing geopolitical balance of power. In 
time, however, the technocratic elite in charge of everyday monitoring and management could 
evolve its own identity that could then not be fully reduced to any single national logic.  
 
These types of transnational organizations have been more or less successful in their attempt 
at setting the rules of the game on a transnational scale. The more successful – the IMF, the 
World Bank and probably also the GATT or later the WTO – have been those with some 
control over compliance and with sufficient means to monitor that the rules they are building 
are indeed being implemented. Control could stem from a degree of dependence of member 
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states on transnational organizations as well as from the capacity these organizations may 
have to associate rewards with compliance and sanctions with non-compliance. 
 
A second scenario for institution building in the transnational space follows from the 
temptation to create a supranational market, or even a supranational state or nation. With a 
little bit of a stretch, once again, and some degree of historical anachronism since a number of 
them were constituted before the emergence of the nation-state, empires are the 
materialisation of such a temptation. In our modern age, the most obvious illustrations of this 
second scenario are constructions such as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 
the European Economic Community (EEC) or the European Union (EU). There are signs that 
NAFTA may also be travelling that road. 
 
Here again, the process of rule-setting and institution building stems from a political, top-
down kind of initiative. Public or semi-public actors, governments or their representatives are 
instrumental in that process even though they may not always be as predominant as in the first 
scenario. The scope and reach of those centrally engineered constructions goes well beyond, 
in general, the scope and reach of transnational organizations. The new rules and institutions 
are enforceable, in the sense of them being formally and efficiently associated with 
enforcement mechanisms that put member states under strong pressure to comply. In fact, the 
reality and strength of enforcement mechanisms combined with the scope of the domain 
controlled might be the key differentiating features between this type of supranational 
constructions on the one hand and transnational organisations on the other. A supranational 
construction such as the European Union is indeed characterized by the strength of 
enforcement mechanisms and thus by its potential clout and impact over member nations and 
states. One type of enforcement mechanisms are direct controls associated positively with 
rewards and negatively with sanctions. Another type of enforcement mechanism is the 
reliance on voluntary compliance where member states are aware of the overall benefits they 
draw from belonging to the supranational construction and, conversely, realize the dangerous 
consequences of not respecting the terms of a contract they entered of their own will. 
 
Self-regulating Communities: Scenario of the Future? 
There is, we propose, a third scenario for institution building in the transnational space to 
which we associate the label ‘self-regulating transnational communities’. This scenario has 
become progressively more widespread in recent years. In this third scenario, all actors 
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concerned by a particular type of transnational activity come together, often in non-structured 
and rather un-formalized settings, elaborate and agree upon collective rules of the game 
(Morgan and Engwall 1999, Cutler et al. 1999). In contrast to the first two scenarii, public or 
semi-public actors might be involved in rule setting but they are not the only ones. In fact, 
private actors might take the initiative and be quite instrumental for the elaboration of rules 
and the building of institutions as well as for monitoring compliance (McNichol and 
Bensedrine 2003, Botzem and Quack 2006).  
 
Another difference with the two previous scenarii is that the logic at work is not external 
control but rather self-discipline or self-regulation. Instead of waiting for public actors to 
impose an institutional frame and thus orient private action, the actors concerned and in 
particular non-governmental and private actors, take the initiative and set their own rules. 
Within an arena or a field of transnational activity lacking initially in structuration, all 
concerned actors collaborate in building institutional arrangements that will constrain their 
own actions, behaviours and interactions. The process is one of voluntary and relatively 
informal negotiation; the emerging structural arrangements are relatively amorphous, fluid 
and multifocal in nature. 
 
Self-disciplining transnational communities of that sort tend to rely on two main categories of 
enforcement mechanisms. One is voluntary compliance; compliance this time not only of 
national states and governments but directly of all actors involved in the process. Compliance 
is voluntary for the main reason that these actors define the rules themselves and inflict upon 
themselves the institutional constraints that will bound their actions and interactions. A 
second enforcement mechanism, socialization, can be identified – although probably more as 
a potential and an objective than as an already existing and concrete reality. Indeed, 
socialization can only emerge as an enforcement mechanism at a later stage. Rules and 
institutions have to be constructed and agreed upon (the habitualisation or pre-
institutionalisation stage identified above), actors have to function within that frame for a 
while (objectification), before the double process of socialization and self-reproduction 
through socialization can really become operative (sedimentation). The advantage of 
socialization as an enforcement mechanism is the decreasing need for direct controls and thus 
for both external rewards and sanctions. Actors socialized through a particular institutional 
frame or within a particular set of rules become their own watchdogs. Ultimately, this 
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institutional frame will have a tendency to become neutral and transparent for those actors 
who function within the space it structures.  
 
This third scenario for institution building at a transnational level is not new. As argued by 
Lehmkuhl (2003) for example, the structuring of commercial arbitration at the transnational 
level by actors themselves – and in particular by private actors – has existed for a long time. 
One could also argue that international cartels, particularly during the interwar period or even 
after in some industries (Cutler et al. 1999, Glimstedt 2001, Lilja and Moen 2003), fit within 
this type of scenario. While that scenario is not new, it has recently been going through a 
period of ‘revival’ after long decades when national states had all but established a monopoly 
over the handling of transnational issues and spaces. Many nongovernmental organizations 
have been established that engage in standard setting, accreditation and other forms of soft 
regulation for others. Large multinational firms, particularly in professional services, have 
become rule-setters and rule-developers of their own (Quack 2006b; Morgan 2006). Informal 
regulatory networks such as the International Competition Network (Djelic and Kleiner 2006) 
are increasingly exerting influence on national regulators. We propose, in fact, that there has 
been an historical evolution overall, since 1945, in terms of which scenario has been 
predominant. The early period, in the years following the war, was characterized by the 
multiplication of transnational organizations. Then came supranational constructions, 
particularly in Western Europe. This naturally, is still going on. At the same time, empirical 
evidence points for the recent period increasingly in the direction of a greater role and place 
for self-disciplining transnational communities (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000, Brunsson and 
Jacobsson 2000, Djelic and Quack 2003, Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006).  
 
Transnational Recombination: Mode and Nature of the Process. 
In each of these three different scenarii, transnational institution building can be analyzed as a 
process of reinterpretation, recombination and bricolage from institutional fragments with 
different contextual origins. We suggest that there are three different modes in which the 
rubbing, contestation and recombination of different institutional fragments can take place at 
the transnational level. 
 
A first, obvious, mode we label here ‘dominant’. In that mode, the building of institutions at a 
transnational level simply reflects one dominant local or national model. Rules and 
institutions originating from one particular national space thus shape in a rather direct way the 
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transnational space. In a second stage, this local turned transnational model is bound to have 
an impact on a number of other national institutional configurations as we will argue below. 
This overall process generally reflects the objective and/or perceived strength of the 
‘dominant’ nation, which itself depends upon a combination of economic, military and 
geopolitical factors with some degree of ideological propping up. Undeniably, since 1945, 
this role of ‘dominant’ nation has been played by the United States and this particular mode of 
recombination can be referred to as a process of Americanization (Djelic 1998, Whitley 2003, 
Djelic and Quack 2003; Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006).  
 
A second mode emerges that we label the ‘negotiated mode’. Institution building in the 
transnational space can come about through the confrontation or ‘rubbing against each other’ 
of multiple locals or nationals, leading to what can be described as a process of negotiation. 
This dimension of negotiation is documented in a number of recent empirical contributions 
(eg. McNichol and Bensedrine 2003, Ventresca et al. 2003, Botzem and Quack 2006). At the 
same time, if we look at then more closely, empirical situations often illustrate in fact the 
interplay between the ‘negotiated’ and the ‘dominant’ mode. All participants to the 
negotiations are not created equal and some of them may loom significantly larger than the 
others in the process. This underscores the ideal-typical nature of the different modes we 
identify and the likelihood that they will co-exist and interact in real-life contexts. In fact, 
while situations of negotiation are rarely perfectly balanced, a situation of dominance is on the 
other hand rarely so extreme as to leave no space for at least partial negotiation. In the context 
of what was described above as ‘Americanization’, for example, what many empirical studies 
show is the concomitant partial alteration, translation and negotiation of the ‘dominant’ model 
when it comes into contact with previously existing and established national institutional 
configurations (Djelic 1998, Zeitlin and Herrigel 2000, Amdam et al. 2003). 
 
Common to illustrations of both the ‘dominant’ and ‘negotiated’ modes is the fact that the 
actors involved – whoever and whatever they are – remain strongly embedded in and shaped 
by the institutional contexts of their home countries. These actors tend in fact to extend the 
actions and strategies used in that context and shaped by it to the transnational arena. This, 
however, is not necessarily always the case. The involvement of actors in processes of 
transnational institution building can – particularly if sustained and recurring over longer 
periods of time – lead to a blurring of identities, particularly national ones (Morgan 2001). 
Once transnational arenas have been structured for a little while, once transnational 
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institutions and rules of the game shape behaviours and interactions, some of the actors 
concerned come to be more directly affected by these transnational institutions than by the 
institutions of the country they may originate from. New actors may also sprout up and the 
only referent for these new actors will be the embryonic transnational institutional context in 
which they were born (e.g. some transnational NGOs, lobbying organizations created at the 
European level, see Salk et al. 2001).  
 
Any further process of transnational institution building in that context cannot anymore fit 
under the categories of either the ‘dominant’ or the ‘negotiated’ mode. What takes place then 
is what we label, for lack of a better word, an ‘emergent’ process. Multiple actors with no 
clear identities and functioning themselves at the interface of multiple rule systems, come in 
collision with each other. If we are to follow the metaphorical use of chaos theory in social 
sciences, the result in this case is bound to be unpredictable (Thietart and Forgues 1995). We 
call this result an ‘emergent’ construction.  
 
The three modes identified here are clearly ideal types. There is bound to be, in other words, 
interaction and interplay between them in real life situations. At the same time, we suggest 
that there has been a shift over time in their relative importance as a mode of transnational 
institution building or recombination. This shift parallels to quite a degree the evolution, in 
terms of scenario, that was identified above. In the immediate post-World War II years, we 
have argued, the main scenario for transnational institution building was the setting up of 
transnational organisations. During this period, the dominant mode – one national model, the 
American one, imposing itself on a transnational scale – was all but overwhelming. The 
dominant mode has not entirely disappeared with the attempts at supranational construction. 
But such projects, by their very nature, meant and required some degree of negotiation 
between the several member nations that were shaping them, generally on a world regional 
basis. Finally, the move towards the third scenario – transnational institution building by self-
disciplining transnational communities – coincides quite closely with the slow assertion of an 
emergent mode. It seems furthermore to fit particularly the case of transnational institution 
building across world regions – in what gets close to being a ‘global’ space. 
 
 
TRANSNATIONALIZATION AND ITS IMPACT ON INSTITUTIONS 
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Ongoing processes of institutional recombination at the transnational level, as described in the 
previous section, have a high potential to challenge and undermine institutional stability and 
identical reproduction at the national level. Transnational institutional frames in the making 
are likely to challenge, to confront and to change – even though slowly and incrementally – 
national institutional systems. They can do so through direct impact – what we call here 
‘trickle-down’ effects or mechanisms. When transnational organisations or supranational 
constructions (e.g. the WTO, the IMF, NGOs, multinational firms or the European Union) 
exert pressure directly at the national level on member governments to redefine national rules 
of the game, then we have what we call ‘trickle-down’ effects or mechanisms.  
 
The impact can also be more indirect. Through cross-national interactions at subsocietal or 
meso levels – sectors, industries, professions or even from region to region – actors are being 
drawn into social spaces that extend well beyond their national context of origin. In that 
process, those actors are likely to be confronted with and to have to function within sets of 
rules that may be quite different from those of their country of origin. Subsocietal actors 
become the vectors and transmission belts through which those new rules are brought into a 
given national space. In certain circumstances, those subsocietal actors may be more than 
mere messengers. They may become real mediators and contribute to pushing those new rules 
up towards the national institutional level, fostering in the process a transformation of the 
national business system or of the national business rationality. This path or pattern we 
associate with ‘trickle-up’ effects or mechanisms. 
 
Trickle-down trajectories 
The challenge, naturally, may come from transnational organisations or supranational 
constructions. Those organisations and constructions quite often turn out to be rule-making 
bodies and some of them have gained significant and direct influence over national polities. 
This is clearly the case with the European Union. In recent years, the impact of the European 
Union has been the object of an increasing number of studies (Leibfried and Pierson 1995, 
Fligstein and Mara-Drita 1996, Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998, Plehwe 2001). With respect 
to the economic realm, other transnational organisations such as the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) or the World Trade Organization (WTO) should be mentioned. These organisations 
contribute to the diffusion of particular rules of the game, which are likely to collide with 
incumbent rules or practices in any given national space.  
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Less attention has been paid to the scenario where challenger rules emerge from a 
transnational space lacking formal structure and being, as a consequence, less visible. What 
we have said above about self-disciplining transnational communities indicates that rule 
setting and rule making can also take place in transnational fields or arenas lacking 
structuration in relative terms. Actors – all kinds of actors, from private firms to consumers, 
lobbies, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) or state representatives – come together to 
negotiate and agree on rules of the game. Examples can be found in the regulation of financial 
markets (Morgan 2001, Ventresca et al. 2003), accounting standards (Botzem and Quack 
2006), international commercial arbitration (Dezalay and Garth 1996, Lehmkuhl 2003), or 
competitive conditions (Djelic and Kleiner 2006). Those rules of the game are institutions, to 
the extent that they structure action and economic activity. For the most part, those are 
cognitive and normative institutions (Meyer and Rowan 1977). The rules that emerge or are 
negotiated in that context are essentially norms that are enacted, appropriated and enforced by 
the actors themselves (Brunsson and Jacobsson 2000). The structural apparatus – formal 
organisation, legislation or coercive machinery – comes if at all in support of those norms. 
 
Once transnational institutions or rules are there or in the making, the question moves to the 
conditions in which they may come indeed to trickle-down to the national level with a 
potentially significant impact upon incumbent national institutions. One important variable 
appears to be the degree of centrality of a particular country, through its private and public 
representatives, in the process of construction and stabilisation of transnational rules. It seems 
fair to differentiate between at least three main groups of countries in that respect.  
 
The first group is a little peculiar; it is a one unit sample. The United States plays quite a 
unique role even though it does not always manage to impose the solution that will best serve 
its interests. An explanation to that special place and role lies in the unique position of 
geopolitical dominance that has characterised the US after 1945 (Djelic 1998, Braithwaite and 
Drahos 2000). Through its private and public representatives, that country has often been 
guiding and structuring the process of construction and stabilisation of transnational rules in a 
more or less direct and visible manner, at least since 1945. A second group is made up of a 
few core (and rather rich) countries, which are proactive and quite involved in trying to shape 
the process. The third group finally is the larger one and brings together those countries with a 
more passive connection to the process.  
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Empirical evidence seems to show that compliance may be more regular, once the rules have 
been agreed upon, within the second group of countries, rich core countries. In the third group 
of countries, those that are more passive in the process of transnational institution building, 
appropriation seems to be more of an issue. The process is likely to be slower with a greater 
distance between the world of discourse and formal institutions and the world of action and 
practice that will remain very much structured by traditional patterns (Meyer et al. 1997a, 
Meyer et al. 1997b). In the case of the United States, compliance appears on the other hand 
quite irregular and changing (McNichol and Bensedrine 2003, ENS 2001, Libération 2002). 
The profound geopolitical imbalance in favour of the US increases the degrees of freedom of 
that country regarding compliance with transnational rules even when it has played a 
significant role in the process of construction and elaboration of those rules. 
 
Other variables with an impact on trickle-down trajectories are the nature of incumbent rules 
and the degree of dependence of a particular country on external players. We hypothesise that 
a country where local rules are weak, either because they lack legitimacy, have proven 
inefficient or a hindrance, are altogether absent or still at a pre-institutionalisation stage, 
creates more space for rules constructed at a transnational level to trickle-down. This can only 
be reinforced in situations of dependence, where a country for example sees the granting of 
financial assistance it badly needs being conditioned upon compliance to a set of 
transnationally defined rules (Djelic 1998). This is not, after reflection, in contradiction with 
our precedent finding. Weak countries tend to belong to the group we have defined above as 
‘passive’. Weakness and dependence may compensate in part for passivity, which might lead 
to more rapid formal compliance than expected. Quite often, however, a significant gap will 
remain between the world of discourse and formal institutions on the one hand and the world 
of practice on the other (this finds confirmation in earlier work by sociologists of global 
society, e.g. Meyer et al. 1997; Boli and Thomas 1999, Meyer and Ramirez 2000). The former 
might indeed be affected through a trickle-down trajectory by transnational challenger rules. 
The latter will tend to stay, at least for a while, embedded in local traditions and national 
institutional legacies. A special and quite different case of dependence should be added and 
mentioned here. Direct political dependence of national countries on a supranational 
construction, such as is the case in the European Union context, is an obvious path for trickle-
down mechanisms. This situation naturally creates conditions where the rules defined at the 
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supranational level are likely indeed to have a rapid and significant impact at the national 
level. 
 
Trickle-up trajectories 
Threats and challenges to national institutional systems may also come from below, from 
subsocietal or subnational levels. Such ‘trickle-up’ trajectories can be of two kinds. First, 
national actors crossing national borders may find that the rules of the game with which they 
are familiar come into collision and sometimes even are in contradiction with rules of the 
game dominant elsewhere. Those national actors could be individuals, groups of individuals, 
firms, associations or networks of firms. This type of scenario will be all the more widespread 
that the internationalisation of economic activities and of exchanges in general is becoming 
increasingly dense and intense.   
 
The opening up of national economies may stimulate a second scenario that is parallel but 
goes the other direction. Foreign actors move into a given national space with rules of the 
game that are quite different from those of local actors. A variant of that scenario is when the 
champions of challenger rules on the local or national scene are themselves locals or nationals 
who are pushing for new rules of the game in order to carve a space for themselves. What this 
is all about is the attempt by new or emerging actors, whether local outsiders or foreign 
entrants or even a combination of both, to redefine rules of the game in an industry or impose 
‘new’ ones in order to enter the field and the game and to reshape it to their advantage (Djelic 
and Ainamo 1999, Lane 2001, Kleiner 2003).  
 
Various empirical studies show how this encounter between incumbent and challenger rules 
plays out at subsocietal levels, whether at the level of the firm (Lane 2000, Tainio et al. 2001), 
at the level of an industry (Lilja and Moen 2003), an organisational field (Kleiner 2003) or at 
the level of a profession (Quack 2006b, Quack forthcoming, McKenna et al. 2003). This 
interplay at the subsocietal level is not neutral for national institutions. Rules of the game may 
change at the subsocietal level well before this is institutionalised at the national level. But 
transformations at the subsocietal level may also reverberate in time at the national 
institutional level. The decision by the German government in 2001 to create a Kodex-
Kommission in charge of ‘modernising the rules and practices of German capitalism’ is a 
clear case of such a process of post hoc ‘regularisation’ (Le Monde, 7 November 2001). The 
object of this commission was to take stock of changes that had already redefined the German 
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economic game and to institutionalise them at the national level. This raises questions about 
the conditions in which contestation and transformation of incumbent rules of the game at the 
subsocietal level are likely indeed to reflect and impact at the national level.  
 
One such condition seems to be the central position and overall leverage of the subsocietal 
actors concerned by or involved in the collision of rules. Changes within core and strategic 
firms or industries are more likely, ultimately, to have some impact on national level 
institutions. This appears to be particularly true in smaller countries as shown by the cases of 
Nokia in Finland (Tainio et al. 2001) or of the forest industry in Norway and Finland (Lilja 
and Moen 2003). In smaller countries, core firms or industries have proportionally more clout, 
strategic importance but also leverage which could explain their more direct impact.  
 
Other important conditions are the strength and legitimacy of those outsiders championing 
and pushing for challenger rules. In that respect, Anglo-Saxon players benefit from something 
akin to a ‘trademark’ advantage in professional fields such as corporate law or management 
consulting as well as in other activities related to banking or financing. This allows them to be 
more forceful and convincing in the promotion of their own sets of rules of the game. 
Naturally, the strength and legitimacy of those outsiders and challengers will be more or less 
filtered and mitigated by the existence and embeddedness of local incumbent rules. Local 
appropriation will likely be more complex and contested in situations where incumbent rules 
already exist and are deeply embedded – when, in other words, local institutional rules have 
already entered the phase of sedimentation.  
 
Another condition seems important that is not unrelated to those identified above. The greater 
the shock or the more intense the collision, the more likely it will reverberate at the national 
level. The collision will be more intense if subsocietal actors – firms, industries, professions 
or even possibly regions – lack protective buffers or else are in a situation of perceived and 
self-acknowledged crisis. The lack of protection can be due to the immaturity of the local 
field. It can be strategically engineered, either by political authorities or by the actors 
themselves, through deregulation for example or a lowering of trade or other protective 
barriers (Djelic and Ainamo 1999). It will also be related, naturally, to the strength of the push 
coming from outsiders and challenger rules. A perceived and self-acknowledged situation of 
crisis will tend to correspond, on the other hand, to a high degree of dissatisfaction with 
incumbent rules, either because these rules do not seem to coevolve with environmental 
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conditions and/or because they narrow the opportunities of local and incumbent actors in a 
changing world.  
 
We argue that under these conditions – or a subset thereof – transformations in rules of the 
game that were initially happening at a subsocietal level are likely to have an impact and 
reverberate, after a while, at the national level.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we have explored the interactions between institutions and transnationalization. 
An important layer of institutions with transnational scope has emerged since World War II 
and plays an increasing role in the governance of economic relations. We need new categories 
and analytical tools to accurately characterize these institutions and their impact on 
institutional change at the societal level. Comparing, contrasting and building upon four 
existing theoretical approaches, we move towards a theoretical model that accounts for 
interactions between institutions and transnationalization. This model consists of two related 
anc complementary arguments. 
 
Firstly, transnational institution-building can be defined as a process of institutional 
recombination that involves elements of different national and local institutional 
arrangements. We have identified different scenarios and modes of institutional 
recombination at the transnational level out of which self-disciplining transnational 
communities with emergent modes of institution-building seem to have become more 
widespread in recent years. Secondly, processes of institutional recombination have a high 
potential to challenge and undermine institutional stability at the national level through 
trickle-down and trickle-up effects. Trickle-down processes can directly influence 
governments to redefine legal rules of the game at the national level. Trickle-up effects may 
infiltrate societal rule systems from the bottom up through cross-border interactions between 
economic actors, social movements and other stakeholders at the organizational field, industry 
or sectoral level. Encounters between challenger and incumbent rules may lead to new forms 
of institutional recombination at these levels. They are likely to impact on national rules 
systems if there is a central and strong position of the transformed institutional field with 
respect to the overall society, a high legitimacy of outside challenger rules and/or a lack of 
protection of incumbent rules because of the immaturity of or a crisis in the field.  
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Our findings suggest that economic and social behaviors are increasingly shaped by the 
interactions between national and transnational institutional orders; at the same time, actors at 
both levels are engaged in processes of institutionalization and de-institutionalization that may 
redefine the carriers, forms and modes of this interaction. Consequently, institutional theory 
and research must consider the possibility that multiple layers of institutions and 
institutionalization may be relevant for the subject under study, and that change processes 
result from complex and combined processes of institutionalization, de-institutionalization, 
and re-institutionalization. For institutional research, this has conceptual, methodological and 
empirical implications that we would like to elucidate, particularly as they relate to 
organizational institutionalism, the subject at the heart of this handbook. 
 
At the conceptual level, our analysis suggests that institutional systems should be conceived 
as open systems that are linked to each other through cross-border interactions between 
various actor groups. The boundaries of these systems are permeable, and the different rule 
systems are likely to diffuse in both directions. Social actors are embedded in locally and 
temporally specific institutional rules of the game. At the same time, they become 
increasingly able to develop horizons of meaning and action that reach beyond their local 
institutional settings. Problems and conflicts between different institutional logics at the 
organizational, societal and transnational level should therefore be considered as a major 
source of institutional change. So far, however, we know relatively little about the specific 
dynamics of change within and between these different institutional layers. More analytical 
concepts that integrate structural features of these different layers with relational and process 
approaches need to be developed in order to discern the interactions between the different 
layers. This new analytical framework must give more attention to interactions between 
cognitive, normative and regulatory mechanisms of institutionalization and de-
institutionalization and to the specific types of legitimacy that they draw on. Institutional rules 
of the game at the societal (generally national) level are often backed by legal or regulatory 
instruments relating to the legitimacy of a democratically elected government, whereas 
institutionalization at the transnational level relies more strongly on cognitive and cultural 
processes of imitation, socialization and adaptation. Problems and conflicts between different 
forms of legitimacy that require resolution can therefore be expected. So far, organizational 
institutionalism studies have concentrated on the organization and organizational field level. 
In future research, organizations and organizational fields need to be conceptualized as social 
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orders that are interlinked to a variable degree with institutional rule systems at a higher 
aggregation level. This may be the national level, but also the transnational level.  
 
Institutional research methodologies and empirical work must better reflect the multilayered 
nature of institutional orders using a three-point strategy. Firstly, the research design should 
better consider the possibility of a nested hierarchy of institutional contexts. Currently, the 
level of analysis (i.e., the organization or organizational field) is often presented as a starting 
assumption that rarely is justified in the research paper. It would be useful to have research 
hypotheses explaining why a particular level or interaction between levels was selected as the 
object of analysis. Given the mutual interaction and diffusion between institutional orders, it 
would be also helpful to have hypotheses explaining the points of openness and closure to 
external influences of an institutional layer to other layers rather then assuming that the 
defined level of an institutional system (e.g., the organizational field or national level) is 
encapsulated from the rest of the world (see Crouch 2005: 158; Scott 2001).  
 
Secondly, methodologies should be reoriented in order to develop appropriate research 
designs for analyzing the interactions between national and transnational institutions. Global 
diffusion pattern studies and comparative analyses of societal institutional systems do not 
cover the interactions between different institutional layers as such. Both neglect cross-border 
interactions and the mutual interdependence and co-evolution of national and transnational 
institutions that may result from these interactions. The emergence of new analytical models 
that assess the emergence of transnational regulatory or issue fields from a process 
perspective and combine these with a comparative analysis of the institutional orders from 
which the participants in these fields originate and which in turn may be affected by the 
development of transnational rule setting is a promising development.  
 
Thirdly, organizational institutionalism researchers could make more valuable contributions 
by employing the available tools for analysis of global and transnational forms of 
organization, ranging from multinational enterprises and financial and knowledge 
intermediaries to more loosely connected communities and networks and their involvement in 
processes of institution-building and institutional change. In this way, the results of 
organization studies could promote a better understanding of the role of organizations as 
vehicles of transnationalization (see also Drori et al. 2006) and enrich the international 
relations literature with in-depth analyses of how processes of dominance, negotiation and 
30 
emergence within international organizations impact on the wider institutional environment. 
At the same time, organizational studies could also help to improve the current understanding 
of processes related to local interpretation and translation of global and transnational 
institutional rules by analyzing them as nested layers of an institutional framework.  
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